@hakoja The vote-locking is there to avoid some kinds of vote-fraud. @Fixee I seem to recall that a part of the same table set can be used, but I don't remember the details. It can be shown that this does not improve or reduce the security of the cipher in any way. Why is this not possible? Of course, we now need a tweak to the key schedule for decryption: apply InvMixColumns on each round key, other than the first and last.

And how does this help in implementing the block cipher? Sorry, I should have read your question more carefully instead of reading the answers/comments. Alle Runden von AES (und Rijndael) haben einen MixColumns-Schritt, außer der letzten Runde, in der dieser weggelassen wird.DES hat eine ähnliche Funktion, bei der sich die letzte Runde geringfügig unterscheidet.Wenn ich mich recht erinnere, bestand das Grundprinzip darin, "die Chiffre in umgekehrter Richtung ähnlich aussehen zu lassen wie in Vorwärtsrichtung". And for AES-DEC we get: 1. 83 can be written as 1000 0011 and is represented by x^7 + x +1 in polynomial term. Sorry about that :(. The idea is that with the ommission one can use a InvRoundFunc which is *structurally similar* to RoundFunc, and as such can share code (in Software) or chip area (in hardware) with the original RoundFunc. – Paŭlo Ebermann 28 nov. 112011-11-28 23:56:00, Try to google for "Influence of the final round" (with quotation marks). A field is a set of numeric(-like) things. x^2 +1 \1. xor ({0d}•s1,c) xor ({09}•s2,c) xor ({0e}•s3,c) (3rd row), While the irreducible S-Box technique will be introd uced in t he AES . @Fixee Actually, you can use the precomputed tables for the final round too, you just use them a bit differently.

AddKey 2. repeat RoundFunc 10 times. Using Vector Example for 128 bit key length AES-De... ff can be written as 1111 1111 and is represented by x^7+x^6+x^5+x^4+x^3+x^2+x+1 in polynomial term. The justification on page 152 of "The Design of Rijndael" is much more complex than I had stated; it only concludes "that the removal of the MixColumns step in the final round does not weaken Rijndael with respect to the four-round saturation attack". xor ({0e}•10) xor ({0b}•b6) xor ({0d}•89), ({0d}•8b)

and "how does this help in implementing the cipher?" Oh sorry — I answered a tangental question. My last comment gives the reasons why it is secure to emit the final MixColumn. Erstellen 28 nov. 112011-11-28 23:10:54 Fixee, As I remember the AES reasoning, for the last round this MixColumns step would not add any security, and thus it was omitted. xor ({0e}•6e) xor ({0b}•7c) xor ({0d}•3d), ({0d}•bd) Why does this make AES\$^{-1}\$ look similar to AES?

My last comment gives the reasons why it is secure to emit the final MixColumn. – fgrieu 29 nov. 112011-11-29 16:04:38. According to the Rijndael design document (top of page 7): In order to make the cipher and its inverse more similar in structure, the linear mixing layer of the last round is different from the mixing layer in the other rounds.

57 and 83 : x^13+x^11+x^9+x^8+x^6+x^5+x^4+x^3+1 mod ( x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x +1) =, x^7+x^6+1 which is equal to 1100 0001 (binary) or c1, The procedure of the multiplication above will be use for calculation of inverse mix column operation.

As far as I can see, AES-ENC would then simply become: 1. page disect the work of mix column operation using polynomial

Let me reformulate what I would like to know: If our goal is to make all rounds in the encryption/decryption equal (I stress that the round function will be different in enc/dec), what is the problem of adding MixColumns in the last round? I tried alot but I can't write for inverse mixcolumn. – Paŭlo Ebermann 23 jan. 132013-01-23 20:52:16, @PaŭloEbermann Yes, but you need a **separate** set of precomputed table just for the final round. AddKey 2. repeat RoundFunc 10 times. Alle Runden von AES (und Rijndael) haben einen MixColumns-Schritt, außer der letzten Runde, in der dieser weggelassen wird.DES hat eine ähnliche Funktion, bei der sich die letzte Runde geringfügig unterscheidet.Wenn ich mich recht erinnere, bestand das Grundprinzip darin, "die Chiffre in umgekehrter Richtung ähnlich aussehen zu lassen wie in Vorwärtsrichtung". xor ({0b}•6e) xor ({0d}•7c) xor ({09}•3d), ({09}•bd) This is onerous in environments where memory is tight. The justification on page 152 of "The Design of Rijndael" is much more complex than I had stated; it only concludes "that the removal of the MixColumns step in the final round does not weaken Rijndael with respect to the four-round saturation attack". = (x^3+x^2+1)(x^6+x^5+x^4+x^3+x^2), x^8+x^4+x^3+x+1/ x^9+x^6+x^5+x^3+x^2 \x+1, x^8+x^4+x^3+x+1/ x^8+x^7+x^6+x^4+ Ok, fair enough.

There is an example of  such operation on FIPS-197 page 10-12. For the latter, I have always found it a **pain** to implement this special-case in AES where you have to omit MixColumns in the final round: for example, you can't use the precomputed tables. The same is true for division (and modulus (remainder)). Here we can use the same code with different (sets of) tables for both decryption and encryption.

xor ({0b}•10) xor ({0d}•b6) xor ({09}•89), ({09}•8b) Fixee wrote in a comment: However, my question is not so much about security implications, but rather by reducing the Multiplicative inverse structure . test Output results:. equation in galois field 2^8. is important to understand the detail of mix column operation. However, my question is not so much about security implications, but rather "how does omissions of MixColumns make the inverse cipher similar to the cipher?" By using different rotations after the lookup, we can use just one of those tables (1 kB). AES – KeySchedule … ist nicht sehr erhellend! While there are some modes of operation which only need the forward direction (and I think they don't even need a random permutation, just a random function), many of them (including the "default-like" CBC) need both directions, and this was even more usual at the time of the AES competition.